John
Bordne United Nations Interview
Seconds
to Stop the Final Countdown: the Cuba Missile Crisis in Okinawa
Side-event
organized by the permanent Mission of Chile to the UN and the Mayors
for Peace.
Analysis and Opinion
George Mindling
“What
counts is not what sounds plausible, not what we would like to
believe, not what one or two witnesses claim, but only what is
supported by hard evidence rigorously and skeptically examined.
Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.”
- Carl
Sagan
On October 27th, 2015, I received an e-mail from Glenn
Jones, a former fellow member of the 1962 TM-76B Mace missile
Installation, Checkout and Verification team at Bitburg Air Base,
Germany. Glenn forwarded an opinion article published in the Bulletin
of Atomic Scientists, dated 25 October 2015, titled “The Okinawa
missiles of October” by Aaron Tovish.
While unfamiliar with the article itself, I was well acquainted with
John Bordne's story. I first heard it while writing “U.S Air
Force Tactical Missiles 1949 – 1969 The Pioneers” with Robert
Bolton, of Lawrenceville, Georgia in 2006 and 2007. John Bordne and I
communicated often about the TM-76B Mace in Okinawa during that time,
not only for the book, but also for my web site about tactical
missiles.
I read the article and was struck by several statements I felt
weren't correct, or were incredibly exaggerated. Two days later, at
the TAC Missileer Reunion in Orlando, I addressed the reunion
attendees after the main dinner asking anyone for comments or
information, especially veterans of Okinawa. While there were members
of the 498th Tactical Missile Group present, no one had
heard the story, and many attendees gave it little credence. I wanted
to know if perhaps I had been wrong in excluding the story from our
book, or if I had been correct in my original assessment.
Charlie Simpson, Colonel, US Air Force (Retired) Executive Director,
Association of Air Force Missileers, sent me an e-mail on November
17th, 2015, asking if I had any knowledge about the same
article as he had received inquiries from members of his
organization. I answered Colonel Simpson;
“Neither Bob (Robert Bolton, Co-author, U.S. Air Force Tactical
Missiles 1949 – 1969 The Pioneers) nor I could corroborate any
part of the story while we were researching our book several years
ago, nor could I find anyone to give it any credence whatsoever. I
posted questions about it on the web site, but have had no
comments. I mentioned it at our last TAC Missileers convention,
which included many 498th TMG vets, and the response was the same. No
one had heard about it before, and no one gave it any credibility
after I mentioned it. While I wasn't there, I can't swear it didn't
happen, but personally, I think it's a case of confused memory.
Operation Sunset Lily was true, but this is a whole different tale.
I soon received an e-mail from Joe Perkins, Executive Director of the
TAC Missileers Association, asking anyone with any knowledge or
information about the Bordne story to contact Travis Tritten, a
reporter for the Stars and Stripes in Washington, DC. Tritten asked
the TAC Missileers Association for information about the Bordne
story. After exchanging e-mails and a lengthy telephone conversation
with Tritten, I gave him permission to use any photographs from my
web site in the article he was writing about the Bordne story. I
agreed to allow the use of any material on my web site as I deemed it
in agreement with the intent of the original contributors. Several
photographs submitted to me by other members of the 498th
TMG were used when the story entitled “Cold War Missileers
Refute Okinawa Near-launch“,
was published on December 23, 2015.
My
TAC Missile website, http://www.mace-b.com/38TMW/,
originally based on the Air Force unit I was assigned to in Germany,
has been open to the public since 1996 when I originally hosted it on
AOL.com. [Over 617,000 page views, average 47 hits a day] It was
moved to its own domain a little over 15 years ago, and has been
popular with former missilemen and Air Force veterans ever since. As
the site became popular, more and more people contributed stories and
photographs to help keep our part of Air Force history alive. One of
the early contributors, Robert Bolton of Lawrenceville, Georgia, -
also a former Mace missile man – and I became good friends and
eventually collaborated on a book based on our experiences with the
web site and our personal experiences with the Mace missile system.
The book, U.S.
Air Force Tactical Missiles 1949 – 1969 The Pioneers,
was published in 2008, and was developed from contributions from
former missilemen from all aspects of the early cruise missiles.
John
Bordne was also one of the other early contributors to the web site,
and later the book.
His descriptions of the early days on Okinawa in 1962 with the TM-76B
Mace and the launch sites were an integral part of the early
deployment story of the Mace B (TM-76B/CGM-13B.) All except one
particular part: John maintained that they (the 498th
TMG) were at DEFCON 2 during the Cuban Missile crisis and came close
to launching missiles during the tense confrontation. While not being
able to explain to me what DEFCON 2 meant, his belief was that all of
the sites on Okinawa were operational in October, 1962, were ordered
to launch their missiles against their assigned targets, and
therefore they were at DEFCON 1. I disagreed with his assumption of
the DEFCON level, but John was adamant and would not budge. I had no
choice but to not include Bordne's story in the book.
I responded to Aaron Tovish's article in December, 2015, on the
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists web page:
“I read your article with great interest as I researched John
Bordne's story in 2008 for inclusion in my book, U.S. Air Force
Tactical Missiles 1949 – 1969 The Pioneers, co-authored with Robert
Bolton. We included many of John's comments and photos in the book,
but could not corroborate or verify his Cuban Missile Crisis story.
In our book's acknowledgments, I thanked John Bordne for his many
comments and contributions to the book, but as I also wrote, 'We
thank the people who contributed stories and material for this book,
much of it derived from or inspired by contributions to the web site.
We have endeavored to verify each and every story, confirm or deny
every rumor. Many stories were left on the table, but several could
not be ignored.' The story about DEFCON 1 at Kadena was one of the
stories we left on the table.”
“One basic reason for our exclusion of his story is the lack of
proof PACAF went to DEFCON 2 at any time during the Cuban missile
crisis. USAFE, under Gen Truman Landon, escalated to DEFCON 3
unbeknownst to NATO Commander, Gen Lauris Norstad, who had been
authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to escalate NATO forces at
his discretion. Gen Norstad, after discussion with British Prime
Minister McMillan, decided not to escalate from DEFCON 4 to DEFCON 3,
although Gen Landon had received permission from direct Air Force
channels as did all other Air Force combat commands. [Nuclear Weapons
Safety – Scott Sagan-Leadership Involvement, pg 103]. The Strategic
Air Command was the only U.S. force I found to advance to DEFCON 2,
and stayed at that level until Nov 15th. Theater Commands such as
USAFE and PACAF were not part of SAC and did not fall under that
command. While part of the SIOP at the time, the TM-76B (CGM-13B) was
a tactical missile, not a strategic weapon.”
I found no records from the 498th TMG, 313th Air Division, or 5th Air
Force to show they escalated to DEFCON 2 during the Cuban Missile
Crisis, and therefore did not support inclusion of John Bordne's
story as a factual component of the book.
I decided to watch the Bordne interview to better understand Aaron
Tovish's article. As
I watched the video,
I realized I was being forced into a position I had avoided for
several years. I quickly began to suspect the purpose and overall
integrity of the interview based on irregular, inappropriate, and
quite frankly, erroneous statements Bordne made while explaining not
only the background to his story, but his Air Force history as well.
It appeared to be more theater than substance.
John Bordne and I trained concurrently, though separately, for
basically the same system and skills early in our Air Force
enlistments. While Bordne was Flight Controls, launch, I was Flight
Controls, maintenance. I, too, was half-way through TM-76A Flight
Controls class at the Lowry Technical Training Center in Denver,
Colorado, early in 1961 when Leonard Estrada, Long Beach, California,
and I were selected to move to the first TM-76B Flight Controls
mechanic training for first term airmen. All previous TM-76B Flight
Controls personnel, both career airmen and NCOs (Non-Commissioned
Officers), were factory trained in Baltimore, Maryland, by
Martin-Marietta.
Bordne and I were both students at the Combat Tactical Missile
School, 4504th Missile Training Wing, Orlando Air Force
Base, Florida, during the second half of 1961 although Bordne stated
he was assigned to Kadena in the summer of 1961 while I didn't finish
training at Orlando until November of that year. Bordne trained as a
launch crew member while I was trained in missile maintenance. One of
my classmates, Leonard Estrada, and I were both slated for assignment
to Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, after graduation, however, at the last
moment – after our hold baggage containing our winter uniforms had
been shipped to Kadena – our orders were changed and we were both
given PCS (Permanent Change of Station) orders for Bitburg Air Base,
Germany, to report in January, 1962. I remained in the Mace B program
for eight years, serving through all of its numerical designation
changes.
I
found the cumbersome, ill-recorded video of the October 28, 2015,
John Bordne interview tedious to watch, so I converted it to the .mp3
audio format so I could listen to it conveniently. I deleted the
first ten minutes of the recording – before the interview actually
starts – and have listened to the entire John Bordne
interview at least three times. I replayed parts of it many times
while taking notes and insuring I understood what Bordne said. I had
to research many of the comments, including those that were not
necessarily germane to the Okinawa issue, as I knew many of them to
be inaccurate Unfortunately, they are indicative of the relative
accuracy of the overall interview. I began to question not only the
information being presented by Mr. Bordne, but also the purpose of
the interview as well.
Bordne's dramatic opening statement "It was hard to believe,
that if we had to launch theses missiles, that we were in last
minutes of our life, and that within days there would virtually no
life left on the planet. I cannot explain the feeling that I had, It
is something I only had once and haven't had since then. Bone
chilling, numbing feeling" is expectedly as profound as the
subject itself. The problems begin about a minute later when he says
emphatically, "I did not want to be a missileer, in fact I
wanted to fly. At Lackland, the Captain that gave us our assignments
stated that we have you slated for missiles because I had taken some
college as, in electrical engineering.”
At this point, I made my first replay to make sure I copied the text
correctly. The statement is so fraught with basic procedural problems
it had to be addressed.
After listening to the entire interview, and reading Bordne's
comments posted on the Bulletin of Atomic Scientist web page that
contained the article, I realized the story had expanded beyond my
initial reading of it some seven or so years ago. I had not heard the
part about sending other launch crew members to the adjoining complex
to possibly shoot the other launch crew, and had not heard the part
about “cracking open” the massive launch bay doors. The first
part is preposterous and the second part is impossible. If it had
been an actual launch order, an EWO (Emergency War Order), any
attempt to prevent a launch would have been considered an enemy
action and met with defensive action, including gun fire if
necessary, and secondly, the launch bay doors had to be partially
open to even start the Mace-B J-33 jet engines as they are “air
breathers,” not rockets as
mistakenly reported recently by a Japanese news agency. To
make the story even more implausible is the thought of raising or
lowering the 100 ton launch doors manually.
While I seriously doubt Bordne's personal intelligence knowledge of
any Cuban refugees or of the 50 SAM sites in Cuba
he mentions, I cannot prove he was not privy to highly sensitive
intelligence data not usually disseminated to enlisted, non-related
personnel (E-3's) in the field. I documented the "sabotage"
event in Germany he wrote about in the comments section of the
on-line article in my book as that is part of the official 38th TMW
record. He mentioned the sabotage story to me in an e-mail in 2007
while I was writing the book, and the story was resolved when Robert
Bolton and I uncovered the documents that showed the “sabotage”
proved to be a contractor error at the worst possible time. As far as
the “3
TM-76B sites that were “sabotaged” from the “Road to nowhere,”
we
only had two sites at Bitburg for a total of 16 launch bays, and we
didn't go operational until 1964. Our first missile test insertion
was at Rittersdorf, Site VII, still a raw site, in September, 1962,
the month prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis. While Bordne states
these were comments made at a pre-shift briefing, the incorrect
assertions simply don't lend credibility to the remainder of his
story.
On December 6th, I forwarded Bordne's story to Carlo
Croce, a former Mace-B Launch Officer who also served at Kadena from
May 1965 to Dec 1966, for clarification of procedures and duties.
Carlo contributed much to my book from the 313th Air
Division history concerning Operation Sunset Lily, the planned launch
of an inert Mace-B from Kadena during the Vietnam conflict, and has
experience in other missile systems as well.
Carlo responded:
“We never received mid-shift codes (did get altitude potentiometer
settings from 5th AF), and only Target Planning had info on the
missile targets. The launch crews had no such information. Target
coordinates were provided as data settings during count up and could
not be changed without shutting the missiles down and counting back
up. The alert crew had no control or knowledge of targets. So
obviously there was no call-out of targets during launch.
We had no pouches and no launch keys. The launch key concept was a
SAC Minuteman ICBM concept. We did have keys to the locked bookcase
that contained the launch authenticator cards. These keys were handed
over to the LO and Mech 1 during crew changeover.”
While Carlo disputes many of Bordne's comments, specifically about
the presence of launch keys, I would recommend contacting Carlo for
his full comments and opinions. Croce did not reinforce any of
Bordne's assertions, and contradicted many of them.
My research continues on several statements, but the overall accuracy
of John Bordne's interview is poor at best, terrible at worst, and
therefore, to me, the overall reliability of his interview is in
question. I doubt most of Mr. Bordne's comments could have been made
to an audience of his peers without serious disapproval or
disagreement. All of the facts are important here, not because they
have direct bearing on the claim of an incident that could have
launched a nuclear attack, but because they show a potential problem
with Mr. Bordne homogenizing past memories into a blend he can
express with one sentence, unfortunately with little or no accuracy.
SUMMARY
In my opinion, something out of the normal routine may have occurred
during A2C John Bordne's duty shift that day in the launch complex at
Kadena, however, I have come to the conclusion the event, as
described by John Bordne, is undoubtedly enhanced and exaggerated,
quite possibly by simply fading memories of fifty-four years ago. I
will leave the reasoning for such enhancements to others.
Aaron Tovish has spent exhaustive hours developing his article and
taken extreme care to place disclaimers about the validity of the
information presented, but I think an intensive program to research
all USAF records, specifically WRAMA (Warner Robins Air Material
Area) to determine if PAL (Permissive Action Link) was installed on
the PACAF systems as they were on USAFE weapons over a month prior to
the Cuban Missile Crisis, should be undertaken before any
organization supports the story as anything more than just an
“opinion.”
Finally, and perhaps most important in understanding the combat
readiness of all operational Mace tactical missiles, including all
TM-76B/CGM13B missiles assigned to the 498th Tactical
Missile Group in PACAF, the 71st Tactical Missile Squadron
and all TM-76A/MGM13A missiles in the 38th Tactical
Missile Wing in USAFE, were continually assigned as QRA, or Quick
Response Alert missiles – the equivalent of the Victor Alert status
for fighter aircraft with nuclear response assignments, regardless of
“DEFCON” status. The DEFCON level had no bearing on missile
launch status or readiness condition with QRA responsibilities.
The Mace missile alert launch responsibilities did not change because
of the Cuban Missile Crisis, or lessen when the crisis was resolved.
John Bordne's contention that PACAF or the 498th TMG
status was raised to DEFCON 2 is not only incorrect, but immaterial
as well. It only serves to confuse what may have actually happened.
George Mindling
January, 2016
Co-author “U.S Air Force Tactical Missiles 1949 – 1969 The
Pioneers”
Port Charlotte, Florida
